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How Time Preferences Differ:
Evidence from 53 Countries
Abstract
We present results from the first large-scale international survey
on time preference, conducted in 53 countries. All countries exhibit
hyperbolic discounting patterns, i.e., the immediate future is dis-
counted more than far future. We also observe higher heterogene-
ity for shorter time horizons, consistent with the pattern reviewed
by Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (Frederick, Loewenstein,
and O’DonoghueFrederick et al.2002). Cultural factors as captured
by the Hofstede cultural dimensions (Hofstede, HofstedeHofstede1991)
contribute significantly to the variation of time discounting, even af-
ter controlling for economic factors, such as GDP, inflation rate and
growth rate. In particular, higher levels of Uncertainty Avoidance
are associated with stronger hyperbolic discounting, whereas higher
degrees of Individualism and Long Term Orientation predict stronger
tendency to wait for larger payoffs. We also find the waiting tendency
is correlated with innovation, environmental protection, crediting rat-
ing, and body mass index at country level after controlling for county
wealth. These results help us to enhance the understanding of differ-
ences across financial markets and economic behavior worldwide.
Keywords : Time preferences; Intertemporal decision; Endogenous prefer-
ence; Cross-cultural comparison.
JEL classification: D90, F40
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1 Introduction
Time preference is one of the most fundamental concepts in economics. It
has been widely applied in asset pricing, project evaluation, and decisions on
investment and saving, among many others. Our survey is a first attempt to
collect large-scale empirical data on country-level variations of time prefer-
ences for monetary payoffs. It is to our knowledge the largest international
survey of this kind.
Many factors have been proposed in the literature that could influence
subjective time discounting, such as income, development, culture, and so
forth (Becker & Mulligan, Becker & MulliganBecker & Mulligan1997). Given
that many of these economic and cultural factors naturally vary among dif-
ferent countries, it would be very interesting to test some of the influencing
factors in a cross-country sample. In this article, we elicit time preferences
in a large sample across 53 countries and examine the impacts of culture on
time preference.
Studies on cross-cultural differences in temporal discounting are rare.
Most of them involved only two or three countries, e.g., Canadian undergrad-
uates and foreign undergraduates of Chinese descents (Tan & Johnson, Tan
& JohnsonTan & Johnson1996), American, Chinese and Japanese graduate
students living in the U.S. (Du, Green, & Myerson, Du, Green, & MyersonDu
et al.2002), and Israeli Arabs and Israeli Jews (Mahajna, Benzion, Bogaire,
& Shavit, Mahajna, Benzion, Bogaire, & ShavitMahajna et al.2008).
One problem associated with small samples are confounding factors. Stud-
ies on a limited number of cultural groups have inherent difficulties in dis-
tinguishing the impacts of socio-economic and cultural factors. For example,
the United States and China are different in many dimensions, including
economic situation, political system, and cultural roots. It is hard to de-
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duce what causes the observed differences in time preference. To study more
systematically the impacts of country-level factors, it is helpful to include
other countries. For example, including countries like Japan or South Korea,
which have similar cultural roots as China, but a similar economic devel-
opment and political system as the U.S., helps to disentangle these factors.
Including countries in Eastern Europe with different cultural roots, but sim-
ilar modern political experiences as China, is another example how a larger
international sample can provide deeper insights.
The large number of countries included in our survey allows us to link
the measured time preference with the economic and cultural backgrounds of
these countries. We elicit time preferences and time discounting for different
time horizons (one month, one year, and ten years). Our main findings are:
• The discount rate for one year is much higher than the discount rate
for ten years: hyperbolic discounting is a global phenomenon.
• Time discounting for relatively short time horizons exhibits much higher
heterogeneity than for longer time horizons, consistent with the pattern
noticed by Frederick et al. (Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’DonoghueFrederick
et al.2002).
• Cultural factors as captured by the Hofstede cultural dimensions (Hofstede,
HofstedeHofstede1991) contribute significantly to the variation of time
discounting. In particular, high levels of Uncertainty Avoidance are as-
sociated with stronger hyperbolic discounting, whereas higher degree of
Individualism and Long Term Orientation predict a stronger tendency
to wait for larger payoffs.
• We also find that countries with a higher pace of time measured from
field studies (e.g., more punctuality and higher walking speed, as de-
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fined by Levine (LevineLevine1997)) are more likely to wait for higher
returns, which provides an external validity for the measurements in
our survey.
The collected data on time preferences and time discounting has al-
ready led to many interesting applications, particularly in behavioral fi-
nance, such as applications to the equity risk premium puzzle (Rieger, Wang,
& Hens, Rieger, Wang, & HensRieger et al.2013), dividend payoff policies
(Breuer, Hens, Salzmann, & Wang, Breuer, Hens, Salzmann, & WangBreuer
et al.2015), and household debt maturity (Breuer, Rieger, & Soypak, Breuer,
Rieger, & SoypakBreuer et al.2014). Institutions dealing with economic pol-
icy issues also find our survey highly valuable. For example, Marcheggiano
and Miles (Marcheggiano and MilesMarcheggiano and Miles2013) from the
Bank of England used our data to explain international differences in the
effectiveness of fiscal policy.
The rest of this article is organized as follows: In the second section, we
review the literature on culture and time preferences. In the third section,
we present the survey methodology. In the fourth section, we summarize the
key results. In the final section, we discuss possible future research directions
for which this survey data could be used.
2 Relationship between culture and time pref-
erences
Economists traditionally assume preferences are given and there is no role
of culture. As Fehr and Hoff (Fehr and HoffFehr and Hoff2011) noted, such
views become obsolete with the growing literature showing that preferences
can be endogenous and can be shaped by societal and cultural influence
5
  
(Bowles, BowlesBowles1998; Henrich, HenrichHenrich2000; Stern, Dethier,
& Rogers, Stern, Dethier, & RogersStern et al.2005; Eugster, Lalive, Stein-
hauer, & Zweimu¨ller, Eugster, Lalive, Steinhauer, & Zweimu¨llerEugster et
al.2011; Hoff, Kshetramade, & Fehr, Hoff, Kshetramade, & FehrHoff et
al.2011).
Perception of time is a part of culture. Culture is typically defined as
something stable over time that distinguishes different groups. Although
an abstract and vague concept to most economists, sociologists and psy-
chologists have studied in depth the impacts of culture on various aspects,
such as personality, cognition, social and economic development. One of the
most influential measurements for culture has been developed by the Dutch
sociologist Geert Hofstede during his long-term research on cross-national
organizational culture. Five persistent cultural dimensions have been found
across different nations and different time periods (Hofstede, HofstedeHofst-
ede1991, HofstedeHofstede2001). Here we discuss three important cultural
dimensions related to time preferences, namely Individualism, Uncertainty
avoidance and Long Term Orientation. Section 3.2 provides more details on
the measurement.
Individualism/collectivism is one of the most crucial cultural dimensions
and has been extensively studied. A high score of Individualism implies that
individuals are loosely connected to the society, and are expected to take
care of themselves. In comparison, in a society with collectivistic culture,
people can be protected by some strong cohesive groups throughout lifetime
as a reward to their unshakeable loyalty. The relationship between individ-
ualism and time preference, however, is not clear. On the one hand, the
social connection in a collectivistic culture may provide its citizens a “cush-
ion” or safety net for potential losses (Hsee & Weber, Hsee & WeberHsee &
6
  
Weber1999; Li & Fang, Li & FangLi & Fang2004; Weber & Hsee, Weber &
HseeWeber & Hsee1998), with which people can afford to wait longer and
to be more patient. On the other hand, in an individualistic society, people
are expected to be more independent and to plan their lives by themselves.
Triandis (TriandisTriandis1971) notes that the “modern man” in a more in-
dividualistic culture is more “concerned with time, planning, willing to defer
gratification,” whereas the “traditional man” in a more collectivistic culture
“considers planning a waste of time, and does not defer gratification.”(p.8.)
Therefore, it is also possible that people in an individualistic culture learn
to plan for the future and hence are more patient. To test the impacts
of a collectivistic culture, Mahajna et al. (Mahajna, Benzion, Bogaire, and
ShavitMahajna et al.2008) compared the subjective discount rates and risk
preferences for Israeli Jews and Arabs with bank customers as participants.
Their findings show that Israeli Arabs, who are supposedly from a more
collectivistic society, have higher subjective discount rates, corresponding to
less patience towards monetary incentives. However, as discussed in the in-
troduction, it is difficult to disentangle confounding factors with only two
cultural groups. Therefore, with a large sample of countries in our study,
we can test more systematically the relationship between individualism and
time preferences, after controlling other cultural and economic factors.
Uncertainty Avoidance is another cultural dimension relevant to time
preferences. A society with a higher Uncertainty Avoidance score tends to be
less tolerant to uncertain situations. Since future is less predictable than the
present, we expect people from cultures with a higher uncertainty avoidance
tendency to prefer immediate rewards rather than future rewards. To our
best knowledge, no empirical studies have investigated this relationship yet.
The third cultural dimension we study is labeled as “Long Term Orien-
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tation.” Hofstede (HofstedeHofstede1991) finds that the Long Term Orien-
tation Score is typically high in East Asia, especially in Confucian cultures.
It implies that people in such cultures tend to put higher value on the fu-
ture, and they are more likely to be patient. Moreover, the concept of “re-
birth” in the dominant religions (e.g., Buddhism and Hinduism) in Southeast
Asia reflects the belief that the current life is only a small time interval of
one’s entire existence. Benjamin, Choi, and Strickland (Benjamin, Choi, and
StricklandBenjamin et al.2010) find that priming with Asian identities makes
Asian-American subjects more patient. Chen, Ng, and Rao (Chen, Ng, and
RaoChen et al.2005) find a similar pattern with bicultural Singaporean par-
ticipants: participants primed with the U.S. culture tend to value immediate
consumption more than Singaporean-primed participants do. However, no
previous studies have directly measured both the Long-term Orientation cul-
tural dimension and time preferences within the same subject pool as our
study does.
3 Methodology
3.1 Measuring time preference
This survey was part of the larger study INTRA (International Test of Risk
Attitudes), conducted by the University of Zurich. The survey contained
three questions on time preferences. The first question was a binary choice
question taken from Frederick (FrederickFrederick2005), which we refer to
as the “wait-or-not” question in the rest of the article. The question was
presented as follows:
8
  
Which offer would you prefer?
A. a payment of $3400 this month
B. a payment of $3800 next month
To measure the implicit discount rate more directly, in the next two ques-
tions, we asked participants to give the amount of a delayed payment which
makes them indifferent with an immediate payment. We refer to these two
questions as the “one-year matching question” and the “ten-year matching
question,” respectively. These two questions are1:
Please consider the following alternatives
A. a payment of $100 now
B. a payment of $ X in one year from now
X has to be at least $ , such that B is as attractive as A.
Please consider the following alternatives
A. a payment of $100 now
B. a payment of $ X in 10 years from now
X has to be at least $ , such that B is as attractive as A.
The amount of monetary payoffs in the questions were adjusted accord-
ing to each country’s Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and the monthly in-
1The choice task was chosen from the the first question from Frederick (2005), whereas
the matching task is adapted from two other questions from Frederick (2005). While at
first glance, these numbers seem to be of different orders of magnitude, they are not when
considering the typical answers given by subjects: the median answer for question 3, e.g.,
was $1400 and 25% of the subjects even chose a value of $10,000 or larger. This is of the
same order of magnitude as the amounts in question 1. A starting amount similar to the
one-month choice question would therefore have led to much larger amounts.
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come/expenses of the local students.2
3.2 Measuring cultural dimensions
In the second part of our questionnaire, we used the Values Survey Module
(VSM94) developed by Hofstede and his colleagues to measure the cultural
dimensions (Hofstede, HofstedeHofstede2001). In particular, we use the re-
sults for the following three cultural dimensions that are relevant to time
discounting:
• Individualism (IDV): IDV measures the degree to which the society
reinforces individual or collective achievement, and the extent to which
people are expected to stand up as an individual as compared to loyal
affiliation to a life-long in-group (e.g., extended family, friends, etc.).
The opposite of individualism is collectivism. For example, the U.S. has
an individualistic culture, whereas Japan has a collectivistic culture.
The index is calculated from four questions in our questionnaire where
the participants were asked to rate the importance of the described
feature for an ideal job (1=of utmost importance; 5=of very little or
no importance) : (1) sufficient time for your personal or family life;
(2) good physical working conditions (good ventilation and lighting,
adequate work space, etc.) (3) security of employment; (4) an element
of variety and adventure in the job.
2The conversion ratio of country i vs. the U.S. is obtained by Xi,USPi/PUS , where
Xi,US is the exchange rate of country i and the U.S., Pi and PUS are the GDP(PPP) per
capita of country i and the U.S. for the year that the survey was conducted. Addition-
ally, whenever possible, we collected information from difference sources to estimate the
monthly income/expenses of local students (e.g., hourly wage for a student job, typical
food prices in cafeteria, etc.) to double check wether the conversion ratios can be applied
to the university students and in some cases adjusted accordingly.
10
  
• Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI): A high score of UAI indicates that a
society is afraid of uncertain, unknown and unstructured situations. It
is derived from four questions. The first question is “How often do
you feel nervous or tense at work (1=never; 5=always)?” The rest of
the questions asked the participants to what extent they agree with
each of the following statements (1=strongly agree; 5=strongly dis-
agree): (1) One can be a good manager without having precise answers
to most questions that subordinates may raise about their work; (2)
Competition between employees usually does more harm than good;
(3) A company’s or organization’s rules should not be broken – not
even when the employee thinks it is in the company’s best interest.
• Long Term Orientation (LTO): When using a Chinese Value Survey in
East Asia, Hofstede (HofstedeHofstede1991) identified a fifth dimen-
sion “long-term-orientation,” or Confucian Dynamism, which captures
the society’s time horizon. It reflects to what extent a society has “a
dynamic, future-oriented mentality.” A higher score implies that the
past is valued less than the future, and people may look more forward.
We measure this by asking participants to rate the importance of the
following questions: (1) “In your private life, how important is ‘respect
to tradition’ for you (1=of utmost importance; 5=of no importance)?”
(2) “How important is ‘thrift’ for you (1=of utmost importance; 5=of
no importance)?”
There are alternative measures for culture, most notably the Schwartz
dimensions (Schwartz, SchwartzSchwartz2004). They are found to be corre-
lated with Hofstede dimensions and in order not to stretch the attention of
the participants too much we did not include more than one scale into our
11
  
questionnaire. Therefore, we focus on the effects of the Hofstede cultural
dimensions which we measured directly in our survey.
3.3 The survey instrument
A total of 6912 university students in 53 countries/regions participated in
our survey. Most participants were first or second year students from de-
partments of economics, finance and business administration. The average
age of participants was 21.5 years (SD=3.77), and 52.5% of the participants
were males.
Each participant was asked to fill in a questionnaire that included 14
decision making questions (three time preference questions, one ambiguity
aversion question, and 10 lottery questions), 19 questions from the Hofst-
ede VSM94 questionnaire, a happiness question, as well as some information
about their personal background, nationality and cultural origin. The ques-
tionnaire was translated into local languages for each country by professional
translators or translators with economic background. The participants were
instructed that there were no incorrect answers to these questions, and that
the researchers were only interested in their personal preferences and at-
titudes. They were also instructed that they should answer the questions
independently without discussions with others.3 In most cases, the survey
was conducted during the first fifteen to twenty minutes of a regular lecture
under the monitoring of the local lecturers and experimenters. The response
rate was therefore very high (nearly 100%) and the number of missing items
relatively small.
After excluding missing responses, the survey yielded 6901 responses for
the first time discounting question, 6608 for the second question, and 6515
3The English version of the instruction sheet is available on request.
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for the third question.
3.4 Control variables
Wealth
Inspired by several studies we decided to include the following control vari-
ables.
Becker and Mulligan (Becker and MulliganBecker and Mulligan1997) pro-
posed a model to capture endogenous time preferences. It states that the
more resources we use to imagine the future, the more patient we are. It fol-
lows that wealth and education leads to patience. Most studies find wealth-
ier people are more patient (Hausman, HausmanHausman1979; Lawrance,
LawranceLawrance1991; Harrison, Lau, & Williams, Harrison, Lau, & WilliamsHar-
rison et al.2002; Yesuf & Bluffstone, Yesuf & BluffstoneYesuf & Bluffs-
tone2008). Poor farm households, for example, tend to have shorter plan-
ning horizons and hence are reluctant to invest in conservation for natural
resources (Mink, MinkMink1993). But there are also several studies that
find no relation between wealth and discount rates (Kirby et al., Kirby et
al.Kirby et al.2002; Anderson, Dietz, Gordon, & Klawitter, Anderson, Dietz,
Gordon, & KlawitterAnderson et al.2004). Since we do not have individual
wealth or income information, we use GDP per capita as a proxy for wealth.
Age and gender
A number of experimental and survey studies find that time preferences are
correlated with personal characteristics such as gender (Silverman, Silver-
manSilverman2003) and age (Green, Fry, & Myerson, Green, Fry, & Myer-
sonGreen et al.1994). We therefore control for these variables.
13
  
Economic growth and inflation
We include the logarithm of the economic growth rate and the annual infla-
tion rate in year 2007, the year before our survey, into the regression analysis.
Since previous times of higher inflation might lead to uncertainty about the
future inflation rate, we repeated all regressions with the log of the maximum
annually inflation rate of the previous ten years, and no significant difference
was found.
4 Results
4.1 Waiting tendency
4.1.1 Descriptive results on waiting tendency
In this section, we evaluate the results from the “wait-or-not” question ($3400
this month or $3800 next month). Table 2 shows the percentage of the partic-
ipants in each country who chose to wait for $3800 next month. We observe
a wide range of variation on the country level – the percentage of students
who chose to wait ranged from only 8% in Nigeria to 89% of Germany. Note
that the implicit interest rate in this question is as high as 11.8% per month
(i.e., an annual discount rate of 280%), which is far higher than the market
interest rates and inflation rates in any of these countries at the time of the
survey. Therefore, the large variation across countries is hard to be justified
purely by the differences in market interest rates or inflation rates.
In particular, 68% of our U.S. sample chose to wait (N=72). For compar-
ison, in the survey by Frederick (FrederickFrederick2005) where he used the
same question with a relatively large sample (N=807) of U.S. undergraduate
students from several universities, only around 41% of the students chose to
14
  
Table 1: Overview of countries in the sample
Country N Country N Country N
Angola 57 Germany 540 Norway 192
Argentina 58 Greece 58 Poland 270
Australia 151 Hong Kong 101 Portugal 137
Austria 150 Hungary 262 Romania 339
Azerbaijan 122 India 61 Russia 162
Belgium 46 Ireland 194 Slovenia 96
Bosnia &Herz. 74 Israel 127 South Korea 105
Canada 84 Italy 81 Spain 45
Chile 100 Japan 274 Sweden 65
China 256 Lebanon 101 Switzerland 483
Colombia 147 Lithuania 105 Taiwan 100
Croatia 115 Luxembourg 44 Tanzania 60
Czech Rep 49 Malaysia 99 Thailand 44
Denmark 73 Mexico 89 Turkey 133
Estonia 126 Moldova 100 UK 62
Finland 124 Netherlands 88 USA 72
France 138 New Zealand 91 Vietnam 131
Georgia 38 Nigeria 93 Total 6912
15
  
Table 2: Percentage of participants choosing the “wait” option
Country Choose to wait Country Choose to wait Country Choose to wait
Germany .89 Lebanon .71 Luxembourg .55
Switzerland .87 Slovenia .71 Moldova .54
Belgium .87 U.K. .71 Angola .53
Finland .86 Ireland .69 Vietnam .52
Netherlands .85 Taiwan .69 Australia .51
Norway .85 U.S.A. .68 Azerbaijan .48
Sweden .84 Argentina .64 Greece .47
Denmark .84 Turkey .64 Spain .47
Czech Rep. .80 China .62 New Zealand .45
Hong Kong .79 Colombia .62 Italy .44
Canada .79 Malaysia .62 Bosnia &Herz. .39
Austria .78 Lithuania .60 Russia .39
Estonia .78 Portugal .60 Chile .37
Israel .78 India .59 Georgia .26
Poland .78 Croatia .58 Tanzania .23
Hungary .77 Mexico .58 Nigeria .08
Japan .74 Romania .57
South Korea .72 Thailand .57
16
  
wait. Among those students who scored high in a separate Cognitive Reflec-
tion Test (CRT), there were 60% choosing the “wait” option, which is closer
to our result. The potential reason is that our participants were studying
economics, and thus more likely to take the market interest rate into ac-
count. On the other hand, even 68% of the U.S. sample is still significantly
lower than the percentage in Germanic/Nordic countries like Germany (89%),
Switzerland4 (87%) or Finland (86%). This difference is hard to explain only
by wealth, education and the macro-economic situations.5
Each participant has stated not only their nationality, but also the cul-
ture they feel they belong to. We classified them into one of seven cultural
clusters, mostly following the classification scheme suggested by Chhokar
et al. (Chhokar, Brodbeck, and HouseChhokar et al.2008). Figure 1 shows
the percentage of choosing the wait option within each cultural cluster. In
general, the Germanic/Nordic group is far more likely to wait (85% chose
to wait) than other cultural clusters.6 Anglo/American, Middle East, and
Asia are similar (around 66% to 68%), followed by East Europe, then Latin
America and Latin Europe. Africa has the lowest percentage of participants
choosing to wait (33%). In the next section, we evaluate to what extent these
differences are related to cultural factors.
4The survey was conducted in the German language part of Switzerland.
5Even for the students from Princeton University, the percentage choosing the wait
option is lower than the percentage among the German students (80% vs. 89%). Actually
some students from our Norway survey even complained that the question was ridiculous
because “everybody would choose to wait” for one month, given the high implicit interest
rate.
6In fact, the eight countries worldwide with the highest percentage are all from this
cultural cluster – a striking result.
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Figure 1: The percentage of choosing to wait grouped by cultural origin
Note: The column shows the percentage of participants who chose the $3800 option
when they were asked to choose between $3400 this month or $3800 next month.
The respondents were asked about which culture they thought they belong to.
We group the countries into seven cultural clusters inspired by the classification
from Chhokar, Brodbeck, and House (Chhokar, Brodbeck, and HouseChhokar et
al.2008).
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4.1.2 Regression results on waiting tendency
We have demonstrated that the responses to such a simple “wait-or-not”
question are highly heterogeneous across countries and across cultural clus-
ters. In the next step, we would like to explore impacts of cultural factors
that correlate with the waiting tendency. To this aim, we control a number
of individual and country-level variables, such as national wealth, gender,
age and so forth.7
We employed mixed-effects multilevel regression with maximum likeli-
hood estimates, with the consideration of interdependence among individuals
within the same country. Table 3 shows the results from multilevel regres-
sions, where the dependent variable is the answer to the waiting question
with country as the group variable. In the remainder of this paper, we use
mixed-effects multilevel regression for other dependent variables as well.
When looking at the impacts of demographic backgrounds, it is interesting
to notice that gender differences play an insignificant role. Although age
turns out to be a significant variable, given the low variation of age among
the student subjects, we consider the variable age only as control and refrain
from making general statements.
On the macroeconomic side, coming from wealthier countries, as mea-
sured by log(GDP/capita), increases the tendency to wait, but other factors
such as growth rate, inflation rate, and economic freedom seem to have little
impact on the waiting tendency.8
7We also repeated all regression analyses without the non-native students which did
not change the results.
8Since interest rates and GDP per capita from free markets versus state-controlled mar-
kets can be defined very differently, we also repeated all regression analyses by removing
countries with an economic freedom index of less than 60 (mostly unfree and repressed,
according to the official characterization). The results were again basically unchanged.
19
  
Model 2 and 3 in Table 3 indicate the influence of cultural dimensions
after controlling for gender, age and macro-economic variables. Individual-
ism and long-term orientation are robust predictors of the waiting tendency,
both on the country level and on the individual level. The influence of long-
term orientation was as predicted. The effect of individualism is consistent
with the observation by Triandis (TriandisTriandis1971) in which partici-
pants from the more individualistic culture seemed to be more “willing to
defer gratification.” It is also in line with the findings by Mahajna et al. (Ma-
hajna, Benzion, Bogaire, and ShavitMahajna et al.2008), where the Israeli
Jews (presumably from a more individualistic culture) exhibited higher pa-
tience for monetary incentives than Israeli Arabs (presumably from a more
collectivistic culture). See Section 2 for more discussion.
Model 3 includes the cultural clusters in the regression. It seems that
even after controlling the Hofstede cultural dimensions, there are still signif-
icant differences across culture clusters. More specifically, participants from
Germanic/Nordic, Anglo/America, Asia, and Middle East cultures are more
willing to wait.
4.2 Inferred Discount Rate: The Classical Approach
To infer discount rates from intertemporal decisions, we use the relationship
between the present value of a cashflow, denoted by P , and its future value,
denoted by F . Formally,
F = P (1 +R)t,
where R is the discount rate and t is the time to be waited. Since both P
and t are given in our questions, the inferred discount rate can be obtained
easily from
R = (F/P )(1/t) − 1.
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Table 3: Multilevel Regression on Waiting Tendency
standardized coefficients (t-value)
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
age -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(-2.70) (-3.01) (-2.96)
gender (male=1) -0.100 -0.014 -0.014
(- 0.90) (-1.25) (-1.26)
inflation rate -0.036 -0.003 -0.002
(-0.48) (-0.51) (-0.42)
Log (growth rate) 0.028 0.051 0.011
(0.69) (1.52) (0.37)
Log (GDP/capita) 0.083*** 0.076*** 0.060***
(3.46) (3.63) (3.08)
Economic freedom 0.001 -0.001 -0.003
(0.24) (-0.24) (-1.45)
Native student dummy 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.017
(2.86) (2.67) (0.79)
Economic major dummy 0.020 0.012 0.009
(1.07) (0.61) (0.46)
IDV average 0.005*** 0.003***
(3.58) (2.65)
IDV ind. diff. 0.000*** 0.000***
(2.65) (2.65)
UAI average -0.001 -0.000
(-1.14) (-0.04)
UAI ind. diff. -0.000 -0.000
(-1.03) (-0.98)
LTO average 0.004* 0.007***
(1.90) (3.26)
LTO ind. diff. 0.001*** 0.001***
(4.48) (4.53)
Africa -0.090
(-1.41)
Anglo/America 0.160***
(3.48)
Germ./Nordic 0.172***
(4.12)
L.America 0.019
(0.30)
L.Europe -0.046
(-0.83)
E.Europe 0.025
(0.60)
Asia 0.130***
(3.09)
Middle East 0.119**
(2.38)
N 6620 6194 6194
Deviance (-2 log likelihood) 7944.7 7387.4 7347.8
Deviance difference (chi-sqr) 50.73*** 120.75*** 199.27***
Note: 1.* significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level; t-values in brackets
2. We denote the country average score of Individualism, Uncertainty Avoidance Index, and Long-term Orientation by
“IDV average,” “UAI average,” and “LTO average.” We denote the difference of individual scores with the country average
score of the respective cultural dimension by “IDV ind. diff.,” “UAI ind. diff.,” and “LTO ind. diff.”
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We have two questions (see Section 3.1) to infer the subjective discount rate
(assuming annual compounding), where t equals to 1 year and 10 years, re-
spectively.
The classical approach states that there is only one “market riskless discount
rate”, which is supposed to be the same for all individuals. Our results in-
dicate that this is not the case. Figure 2 shows the median implicit annual
interest rate for one-year and 10-year matching questions for all countries.9
We observe substantial heterogeneity of the implicit interest rate across indi-
viduals and across countries. The median implicit annual interest rate for the
one year question (R1year) is 100%, ranging from 14% in Australia to 1567%
in Bosnia & Herzegovina, whereas the median implicit annual interest rate
for the ten year question (R10year) is 29%, ranging from 7% in Thailand and
Spain to 73% in Bosnia & Herzegovina.
For all countries except for Australia, the median R1year is higher than
R10year, which is consistent with the typical empirical findings that discount
rates decrease with longer time horizons. This is also true at the individual
level. In total, 87% participants had an implicit interest rate R1year higher
than R10year. A paired t-test shows that, for all countries except for Finland
and India, the average implicit interest rate for one year is significantly higher
than the implicit interest rate for ten years at 5% level.
The classical discounted utility model assumes consistent time preferences
by using an exponential discounting model. It implies that the time prefer-
ence between any adjacent periods should hold constant. Consistent with
9We exclude Georgia from this analysis: Georgia had an extremely high implicit interest
rate, especially for the one-year-matching question (14900% for the one-year question, and
86% for the ten-year question). The potential reason is that the survey in Georgia has
been conducted two months before the outbreak of the Russian-Georgian war in 2008.
The feeling of uncertainty induced by the tensions preluding the war may have induced
high discounts for the near future.
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previous empirical findings (Thaler, ThalerThaler1981; Benzion, Rapoport,
& Yagil, Benzion, Rapoport, & YagilBenzion et al.1989; Du et al., Du,
Green, & MyersonDu et al.2002; Frederick et al., Frederick, Loewenstein, &
O’DonoghueFrederick et al.2002), our results show that most people in most
countries discount the near future more than the far future. This pattern can
be elegantly modelled by the (quasi-)hyperbolic and subadditive discounting
models, which we discuss in more details in the following sections.
Figure 2: Median Implicit annual interest rate for 1-year and 10-year horizon
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4.3 Quasi-hyperbolic and subadditive discounting model
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting model
The quasi-hyperbolic discounting model is usually defined in discrete time
periods as follows:
u(x0, x1, ..., xT ) = u(x0) +
T∑
t=1
βδtu(xt).
Figure 3: Median values of Parameters in Hyperbolic Discounting Model for
All Countries
This discount function has been used by Phelps and Pollak (Phelps and
PollakPhelps and Pollak1968) to study intergenerational discounting and by
Laibson (LaibsonLaibson1997) to intra-personal decision problems. When
0 < β < 1 and 0 < δ < 1, people appear to be more patient in the long run
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and less patient for the immediate future. The per-period discount rate be-
tween now and the next period is (1−βδ)/βδ and the per-period discount rate
between any two future periods is (1− δ)/δ, which is less than (1− βδ)/βδ.
The quasi-hyperbolic discounting model assumes a declining discount rate
between this period and the next, but a constant discount rate thereafter.
It has often been discussed in the context of irrationality, such as lack of
control, and thus used to justify the need for commitment devices. In partic-
ular, β refers to the degree of “present bias”. Larger β implies less present
bias. When β=1, the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model coincides with the
standard exponential discounting model. We call the other parameter δ the
long-term discount factor.
When we assume a linear utility function, the two matching questions
about time discounting can be represented as:
100 = βδF1year,
100 = βδ10F10year.
Thus δ and β can be inferred from the responses F1year and F10year:
δ =
(
F1year
F10year
)1/9
,
β =
100
δF1year
.
For all participants, the median value of β is 0.60 (Mean=0.56, SD=0.36),
and the median value of δ is 0.82 (Mean=0.82, SD=0.12). To reduce the influ-
ence from outlier responses, we have excluded a small number of participants
from the analysis, since their β or δ was large (11 participants with β > 2
and 15 participants with δ > 2), probably by mistake. See Figure 3 for a plot
of parameter estimates of β and δ for each country. Note that the variation
in the present bias discount factor β is much higher than the variation in the
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long-term discount factor δ.
Subadditive discounting model
Declining patience can also be explained by subadditive time discounting,
i.e., people discount more when the delay is divided into shorter subinter-
vals than when it is undivided (Read, ReadRead2001; Read & Roelofsma,
Read & RoelofsmaRead & Roelofsma2003; Scholten & Read, Scholten &
ReadScholten & Read2010, Scholten ReadScholten Read2006). Hyperbolic
discounting mainly reflects impulsiveness, whereas subadditive discounting
mainly reflects perception of time (Zauberman, Kim, Malkoc, & Bettman,
Zauberman, Kim, Malkoc, & BettmanZauberman et al.2009; Read, Read-
Read2001; Scholten & Read, Scholten & ReadScholten & Read2006). It
would imply, in the context of our questions in the survey, that one year is
discounted more than ten years simply because it is a shorter interval, but
not because it is more present. This suggests that time discounting is not
only a function of how far away the outcome is from now, but also a function
of the length of the time interval.
Read (ReadRead2001) suggests the following subadditive discounting func-
tion:
fT ′→T =
1
1 + k(T − T ′)s
where fT ′→T represents the discount factor from time T ′ to T , k is the hy-
perbolic discounting factor, and s is a parameter that captures the perception
of time.
Again, assuming a linear utility function, the two matching questions
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about time discounting can be represented as
100 =
F1year
1 + k · 1s , 100 =
F10year
1 + k · 10s .
Thus k and s can be inferred from the responses F1year and F10year:
k =
F1year
100
− 1,
s = [log10(log(1+k)(F10year/F1year)] + 1.
4.4 Regression results on quasi-hyperbolic and subad-
ditive discounting factors
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting model
Table 4 and 5 show the results from regression analyses, where the de-
pendent variables are the quasi-hyperbolic time discounting factors β and δ,
respectively. Similar to previous regression results in Table 3, no significant
gender differences are found. Although age is again significant, we don’t
make general conclusions due to the low variation in our sample. GDP per
capita is also a robust predictor and participants from wealthier countries
tend to discount less (higher β and δ) and thus tend to be more patient, con-
sistent with the pattern for the waiting tendency question in Table 3. Growth
rate, inflation rate, and economic freedom seem to have no significant effects,
similar to the findings in Table 3.
Let us now take a look at the cultural variables: for β, we find a strong
effect of Uncertainty Avoidance at both country and individual level (Ta-
ble 4): individuals coming from countries with a high level of UAI and with
higher than country-average UAI tend to have higher present bias. Table 4
also shows that individuals with Long Term Orientation higher than their
country averages are less likely to have present bias, i.e., higher values of β.
It is also interesting to see that the long-term discount factor δ in Table 5 is in
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Table 4: Multilevel Regression on Present Bias Discount Factor β
standardized coefficients (t-value)
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
age 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.166***
(7.46) (7.13) (7.08)
gender (male=1) 0.013 0.016 0.015
(1.17) (1.40) (1.33)
inflation rate -0.000 -0.000 0.003
(-0.01) (-0.03) (0.27)
Log (growth rate) -0.115 -0.935 -0.122*
(-1.39) (-1.25) (-1.71)
Log (GDP/capita) 0.112** 0.110** 0.119***
(2.36) (2.46) (2.72)
Economic freedom -0.004 -0.007 -0.009*
(-0.70) (-1.42) (-1.94)
Native student dummy 0.017 0.007 0.008
(0.84) (0.32) (0.36)
Economic major dummy 0.051*** 0.432** 0.043**
(2.61) (2.15) (2.16)
IDV average 0.000 0.001
(0.16) (0.19)
IDV ind. diff. 0.000 0.000
(0.15) (0.17)
UAI average -0.007*** -0.006**
(-2.70) (-2.32)
UAI ind. diff. -0.000** -0.000**
(-2.45) (-2.44)
LTO average 0.003 0.004
(0.70) (0.89)
LTO ind. diff. 0.001*** 0.001***
(2.74) (2.76)
Africa -0.821
(-0.96)
Anglo/America 0.017
(0.34)
Germanic -0.008
(-0.18)
L.America -0.006
(-0.07)
L.Europe -0.104
(-1.56)
E.Europe -0.101**
(-2.06)
Asia 0.048
(0.93)
Middle East -0.021
(-0.32)
Number of Obs 6192 5833 5833
Deviance (-2 log likelihood) 7213.5 6744.4 6735.0
Deviance difference (chi-sqr) 82.90*** 107.65*** 122.97***
Note: 1. Larger values imply more patience.
2. * significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level; t-values in brackets
3. We denote the country average score of Individualism, Uncertainty Avoidance Index, and Long-term Orientation by
“IDV average,” “UAI average,” and “LTO average.” We denote the difference of individual scores with the country average
score of the respective cultural dimension by “IDV ind. diff.,” “UAI ind. diff.,” and “LTO ind. diff.”
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Table 5: Multilevel Regression on Long-term Discount Factor δ
standardized coefficients (t-value)
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
age 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003***
(3.80) (4.19) (4.24)
gender (male=1) -0.001 0.001 0.001
(-0.35) (0.26) (0.23)
inflation rate -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(-0.59) (-0.48) (-0.22)
Log (growth rate) 0.003 -0.000 0.001
(0.31) (-0.01) (0.15)
Log (GDP/capita) 0.009* 0.013*** 0.014**
(1.77) (2.64) (2.59)
Economic freedom 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.91) (0.13) (0.07)
Native student dummy -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(-0.15) (-0.21) (-0.04)
Economic major dummy 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.80) (0.79) (0.81)
IDV average -0.000 -0.000
(-1.36) (-1.03)
IDV ind. diff. 0.000 0.000
(0.92) (0.91)
UAI average -0.000 -0.000
(-1.06) (-0.92)
UAI ind. diff. 0.000* 0.000
(1.65) (1.64)
LTO average -0.000 -0.001
(0.57) (-1.15)
LTO ind. diff. 0.000 0.000
(0.38) (0.36)
Africa -0.006
(-0.34)
Anglo/America -0.010
(-0.78)
Germanic -0.001
(-0.09)
L.America 0.010
(0.58)
L.Europe -0.001
(-0.05)
E.Europe -0.002
(-0.19)
Asia -0.002
(-0.16)
Middle East -0.018
(-1.26)
Number of Obs 6196 5837 5837
Deviance (-2 log likelihood) 9272.8 8784.0 8787.4
Deviance difference (chi-sqr) 33.23*** 48.04*** 50.56***
Note: 1. Larger values imply more patience.
2. * significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level; t-values in brackets
3. We denote the country average score of Individualism, Uncertainty Avoidance Index, and Long-term Orientation by
“IDV average,” “UAI average,” and “LTO average.” We denote the difference of individual scores with the country average
score of the respective cultural dimension by “IDV ind. diff.,” “UAI ind. diff.,” and “LTO ind. diff.”
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Table 6: Multilevel regression of hyberbolic discounting rate k
standardized coefficients (t-value)
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
age -0.070*** -0.069*** -0.689***
(-10.29) (-9.98) (-9.95)
gender (male=1) -0.116*** -0.121*** -0.119***
(-2.73) (-2.75) (-2.71)
inflation rate 0.011 0.012 -0.003
(0.22) (0.27) (-0.08)
Log (growth rate) 0.379 0.282 0.377
(1.37) (1.16) (1.61)
Log (GDP/capita) -0.360** -0.357** -0.370**
(-2.25) (-2.43) (-2.54)
Economic freedom 0.001 0.015 0.022
(0.08) (0.92) (1.36)
Native student dummy -0.073 -0.389 -0.288
(-0.96) (-0.50) (-0.33)
Economic major dummy -0.273*** -0.259*** -0.259***
(-3.69) -3.39) (-3.39)
IDV average -0.005 -0.003
(-0.54) (-0.37)
IDV ind. diff. -0.000 -0.000
(-0.22) (-0.22)
UAI average 0.028*** 0.025***
(3.24) (2.92)
UAI ind. diff. 0.001** 0.001**
(2.47) (2.47)
LTO average -0.007 -0.127
(-0.47) (-0.79)
LTO ind. diff. -0.003*** -0.003***
(-2.78) (-2.78)
Africa 0.419
(1.31)
Anglo/America -0.104
(-0.53)
Germanic -0.041
(-0.23)
L.America 0.161
(0.47)
L.Europe 0.294
(1.18)
E.Europe 0.234
(1.28)
Asia -0.261
(-1.35)
Middle East 0.063
(0.26)
Number of Obs 6093 5747 5747
Deviance (-2 log likelihood) 23151.3 21831.0 21822.2
Deviance difference (chi-sqr) 151.38*** 186.70*** 202.27***
Note: 1. Larger values imply more patience.
2. * significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level; t-values in brackets
3. The dependent variable is ln(k). We denote the country average score of Individualism, Uncertainty Avoidance Index,
and Long-term Orientation by “IDV average,” “UAI average,” and “LTO average.” We denote the difference of individual
scores with the country average score of the respective cultural dimension by “IDV ind. diff.,” “UAI ind. diff.,” and “LTO
ind. diff.”
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Table 7: Multilevel regression of subadditivity factor s
standardized coefficients (t-value)
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
age 0.021*** -0.020*** -0.020***
(-8.62) (-8.27) (-8.29)
gender (male=1) -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.048***
(-3.21) (-3.08) (-2.99)
inflation rate -0.002 -0.001 -0.006
(-0.23) (-0.15) (-0.68)
Log (growth rate) 0.084 0.070 0.078
(1.49) (1.38) (1.63)
Log (GDP/capita) -0.038 -0.032 -0.025
(-1.12) (-1.00) (-0.77)
Economic freedom -0.002 0.000 0.002
(-0.58) (0.05) (0.68)
Native student dummy -0.008 -0.014 -0.010
(-0.29) (-0.48) (-0.31)
Economic major dummy -0.076*** -0.076*** -0.078***
(-2.75) (-2.70) (-2.77)
IDV average -0.001 -0.002
(-0.62) (-0.95)
IDV ind. diff. 0.000 0.000
(1.48) (1.52)
UAI average 0.005*** 0.004**
(2.77) (2.13)
UAI ind. diff. 0.000* 0.000*
(1.80) (1.81)
LTO average -0.000 -0.003
(-0.06) (-0.97)
LTO ind. diff. -0.001*** -0.001**
(-2.62) (-2.59)
Africa 0.166
(1.60)
Anglo/America -0.053
(-0.75)
Germanic 0.030
(0.49)
L.America 0.144
(1.44)
L.Europe 0.044
(0.52)
E.Europe 0.169***
(2.70)
Asia -0.029
(-0.45)
Middle East 0.077
(0.96)
Number of Obs 5446 5163 5163
Deviance (-2 log likelihood) 9171.8 8723.3 8706.8
Deviance difference (chi-sqr) 106.15*** 131.58*** 157.44***
Note: 1. Larger values imply more patience.
2. * significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level; t-values in brackets
3. The dependent variable is ln(k). We denote the country average score of Individualism, Uncertainty Avoidance Index,
and Long-term Orientation by “IDV average,” “UAI average,” and “LTO average.” We denote the difference of individual
scores with the country average score of the respective cultural dimension by “IDV ind. diff.,” “UAI ind. diff.,” and “LTO
ind. diff.”
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general not influenced by cultural dimensions, and only affected by country
wealth level (GDP/capita).
Subadditive time discounting model
Table 6 and 7 show the results from regression analyses, where the depen-
dent variables are the hyperbolic time discount rate k and the subadditivity
factor s, respectively. It seems that male and economic students tend to be
more patient (lower k) but have stronger subadditivity (lower s), whereas
older students tend to be more patient and have less subadditivity of time
discounting. Participants from wealthier countries (i.e., higher GDP per
capita) tend to discount less and have lower value of k (Table 6). However,
wealth is not found significant in predicting subadditivity (Table 7). Growth
rate, inflation rate, and economic freedom seem to have no significant effects,
similar to previous results.
Concerning the cultural variables, we find again a strong effect of Uncer-
tainty Avoidance both on the country and on the individual level (Table 6
and Table 7): higher UAI corresponds to higher discounting, but less sub-
additivity. Table 6 also shows that individuals with Long Term Orientation
higher than their country averages discount less, but they may be prone to
stronger subadditivity, as shown in Table 7.
4.5 Partial correlations between different measurement
of time preference
As mentioned before, we are not the first to study the relationship between
culture and time. There is indeed an interesting connection to previous
works in social psychology: Robert Levine defined and measured a concept
which he called “pace of time” in a field study across 31 countries (Levine,
LevineLevine1997). This overall-pace measure is calculated out of three mea-
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sures that could be obtained in most countries: walking speed, postal service
speed, and clock accuracy. Interestingly, we find this measurement is highly
correlated with our measured waiting tendency (ρ = 0.44, p < 0.01) (see
Table 8).10
Table 8: Partial correlations between different measurements of time prefer-
ence with log(GDP/cap) as control variable
INTRA Levine Globe
Present bias Long term Time Future orientation
β discount δ pace (Societal practices)
Waiting tendency 0.23 0.03 −0.53** 0.46***
df 50 50 18 32
Present bias β 0.49*** 0.01 0.29*
df 50 18 33
Long term discount δ −0.03 0.10
df 18 33
Note:
1.* significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level;
2. Waiting tendency is the percentage of participants in each country who chose to wait
one month in question 1. β and δ are the median value of present bias and long-term
discount factor for each country, based on the responses to Question 2 and 3. “Time
pace” is measured by Levine (LevineLevine1997) in his field study to capture the tempo
and punctuality in a country. The lower score implies faster speed and more punctuality.
“Future orientation” is measured by House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, and Gupta (House,
Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, and GuptaHouse et al.2004), p.304. Higher scores reflect a
more long-term perspective as the accepted norm for the organizations.
10Further regression analyses showed that the time pace measure is significant even when
we control for GDP per capita.
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This can be most likely understood by considering the discounting effect
for disutilities: an “impatient” person would be very “patiently” procras-
tinating some dull or annoying tasks. This attitude would then manifest
itself in slow walking speed, slow and inaccurate service and the tendency to
postpone tedious tasks like adjusting a watch. We did not have such disu-
tility questions in our survey, but other surveys found a strong correlation
between impatience for rewards and procrastinating behavior for disutilities
(Benzion et al., Benzion, Rapoport, & YagilBenzion et al.1989). The corre-
lation of Levine’s measurement from the field study and our measurement
from survey questions can be considered as a valuable cross-validation of
both measures.
4.6 Potential applications
In the following, we want to demonstrate the validity and potential usefulness
of our data on four simple examples. Each of them could be taken as a
starting point for further research, based on our survey data.
4.6.1 Innovation
As the first example for possible applications of our measurement, we in-
vestigate whether we can predict a country’s innovation capability by the
measured patience. Technological change and innovation are often treated
as exogenous variables in economic modelling. However, Romer (Romer-
Romer1990) argues that it can be endogenously determined. He points out
that an increase in patience will increase research and thus economic growth,
which is consistent with the intuition that one must forego some immediate
benefits to invest in research and innovation, in order to get larger rewards
in the future.
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We test the relationship of patience with the “innovation factor” from the
Global Competitive Report 2008-2009 (Porter & Schwab, Porter & Schwab-
Porter & Schwab2008). It measures the technological innovation of a country,
in particular investment in research and development (R & D) in the private
sector, the presence of high-quality scientific research institutions, collabo-
ration in research between universities and industry, and the protection of
intellectual property. We find a positive correlation between the response of
our “wait-or-not” question with the innovation factor at the country level.
The first two models in Table 9 show that after controlling the wealth level
of the country, the response to the waiting question is still highly significant
in predicting the innovation factor. This result suggests that although the
wealth level (and hence a general level of a country’s economy) is crucial
to stimulate innovation, the attitude towards future also plays an important
role. For example, while 69% of Taiwanese participants prefer to wait in the
one-month question, only 44% of our Italian students prefer to wait. The two
countries have the same GDP per capita in 2007, but Taiwan scored much
higher in the innovation factor than Italy (5.26 vs. 4.19). It is worthwhile
to investigate further to what extent and under what mechanism a general
attitude towards the future is related to the innovation activity.
4.6.2 Environmental protection
Studies have revealed that time preference is related to the practice of envi-
ronmental preservation. For example, farmers who discount the future more
strongly were less likely to use soil conservation measures (Yesuf & Bluffs-
tone, Yesuf & BluffstoneYesuf & Bluffstone2008). Since the wealth level is
one important determinant of time preference, one may argue that we should
focus on poverty reduction to make people discount the future less. However,
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it is not clear to what extent time preference per se is a driving factor for
a lack of environmental concern. We illustrate a regression analysis to ex-
amine the relative impacts of a country’s wealth level (as measured by GDP
per capita) and the average patience level (as measured by our first survey
question). The dependent variable is the “Ratio of Gasoline Price to the
World Average” from the report of Environmental Sustainability Index by
Esty et al. (Esty, Levy, Srebotnjak, and SherbininEsty et al.2005). This mea-
sure is an indicator of the degree that environmental externalities have been
internalized, and hence reflects the concern on environmental sustainability.
Model 3 and 4 in Table 9 demonstrate that our measured time preference
has a significant impact on gasoline prices at the country level, after control-
ing GDP per capita. Our finding is in line with the experimental study by
Hardisty and Weber (Hardisty and WeberHardisty and Weber2009), where
they find that people discount environmental outcomes in a similar way to
monetary outcomes. This would help policy makers to understand societal
discount rates across countries.
4.6.3 Credit Rating
Empirical evidence shows that individual time preferences are correlated with
credit card borrowing and debt maturity choice (Meier & Sprenger, Meier
& SprengerMeier & Sprenger2010; Breuer et al., Breuer, Rieger, & Soy-
pakBreuer et al.2014). In a Diamond-type overlapping generations model,
Buiter (BuiterBuiter1981) shows that the country with a higher discount-
ing rate runs a current account deficit. Here we would like to see whether
the country-level time preference measure correlates with the credit rating of
sovereign bonds, which reflects the quality of sovereign bond, the degree of
public borrowing, and the probability of defaults. Model 5 and 6 in Table 9
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show that the country average response to our waiting question is signifi-
cantly correlated with the credit rating of sovereign bonds at the country
level, again, after controlling the GDP per capita.
4.6.4 Body Mass Index (BMI)
It is also found that time preference can predict health-related behavior such
as smoking and alcohol consumption, and nutrition intake (Khwaja, Sloan,
& Salm, Khwaja, Sloan, & SalmKhwaja et al.2006; Chabris, Laibson, Mor-
ris, Schuldt, & Taubinsky, Chabris, Laibson, Morris, Schuldt, & Taubin-
skyChabris et al.2008; Weller, Cook III, Avsar, & Cox, Weller, Cook III,
Avsar, & CoxWeller et al.2008). In particular, Chabris et al. (Chabris,
Laibson, Morris, Schuldt, and TaubinskyChabris et al.2008) and Sutter,
Kocher, Gla¨tzle-Ru¨tzler, and Trautmann (Sutter, Kocher, Gla¨tzle-Ru¨tzler,
and TrautmannSutter et al.2013) find that time preference measure elicited
from choices in experiments correlates with the body-mass-index (BMI) for
adults and adolescents. Consistent with their findings, the last two columns
in Table 9 shows that the average weighting tendency can explain a certain
degree of cross-country variation for the BMI. The countries with stronger
tendency to wait tend to have a low BMI after controlling the country wealth
level.
Figure 4 provides a graphical overview of the relationship between the
average waiting tendency and the above four variables. The y-axis represents
the residuals of dependent variables after regressing on the GDP per capita.
It indicates that the waiting tendency can explain some variations of the
remaining residuals that can not be explained by the GDP per capita.
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4.7 Further Applications
As we mentioned in the introduction, there have already been many appli-
cations of this cross-country comparison, in the field of behavioral finance
where market-level behavior might be influenced by time discounting. Other
applications can be found in economic policy analysis. There are certainly
more questions that could be answered with the help of this data. Here are
two examples:
• Buiter (BuiterBuiter1981) presents a theoretical model using country-
level time preferences to explain the capital movement between coun-
tries. The model has not been tested empirically, but now that would
be possible.
• Shiller (ShillerShiller1999) suggests intergenerational and international
risk sharing in pension system, and emphasizes that the international
risk sharing is rarely discussed. Empirical evidence of the degree of
time discounting across countries can be an important input for such
discussions.
All of these examples show that systematic investigations and documen-
tations of time preferences across countries will definitely deepen our under-
standing of the discrepancies across countries, and will also provide policy
makers with useful advice for development at a global level.
5 Discussion
5.1 Interpretation of main results
Our study provides further evidence that hyperbolic discounting is a universal
phenomenon. In general, people are more patient for the distant future and
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Figure 4: Waiting Tendency vs. Residual of Dependent Variables
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less patient for the immediate future. Such time inconsistency has also been
found in non-human animals (Du et al., Du, Green, & MyersonDu et al.2002;
Fehr, FehrFehr2002; Green, Fisher, Perlow, & Sherman, Green, Fisher, Per-
low, & ShermanGreen et al.1981; Mazur, MazurMazur1987; Rodriguez &
Logue, Rodriguez & LogueRodriguez & Logue14). Studies from psychologi-
cal, ecological and neurological perspectives help us to understand the deeper
roots of this behavioral pattern (Green & Myerson, Green & MyersonGreen
& Myerson1996; Camerer, Loewenstein, & Prelec, Camerer, Loewenstein, &
PrelecCamerer et al.2005).
In addition to such general features of time preferences, we have also
documented the systematic variation in time preferences, as compared to the
situational and cultural factors of the countries. As suggested by Shefrin and
Thaler (Shefrin and ThalerShefrin and Thaler1988), intertemporal choice can
be composed by two opposite processes – an affective and impulsive process
versus a more patient far-sighted process, which correspond to different parts
of the brain, which has been observed later in various studies on brain reac-
tions (Camerer et al., Camerer, Loewenstein, & PrelecCamerer et al.2005).
We have essentially three measurements in our survey, with different time
horizons (one month, one year, and ten years).
The waiting question might reflect a more intuitive and impulsive de-
cision process, whereas the long-term discount factor δ corresponds to the
far-sighted decision process. The present bias factor β based on a short-term
question with a one-year time horizon lies somewhere in the middle of the
spectrum. Consequently, we find different sets of covariates for these three
measures. Whether controlling for macroeconomic conditions or not, we find
strong evidence for a cultural influence on time discounting in the case of
the two “behavioral” measurements (waiting tendency and β). The effects,
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however, differ: the waiting tendency is significantly correlated with the indi-
vidualism and long term orientation cultural dimensions, whereas β is more
correlated with the uncertainty avoidance. It might be that the impulsive
waiting tendency is more deeply rooted in the life style (individualistic vs.
collectivistic) and the cultural values on the future (long term orientation).
The decision involving a longer time horizon then reflects more the situational
concern rather than the cultural manifestation. Uncertainty avoidance, as
Hofstede (HofstedeHofstede2001) suggested, is more concerned with the sit-
uation, as compared with the other two cultural dimensions, and it seems to
play a more important role on the planning on intermediate terms (e.g., one
year). Our results also show that when it comes to long term decisions (ten
years), people seem to be implicitly more influenced by the macroeconomic
condition such as GDP and growth rate, rather than the cultural factors.
The long-term discount factor shows the least variation among the three
measures, which is more consistent with the traditional economic model and
seems to point to a more “rational” decision process.
According to Graham (GrahamGraham1981), the concept of time value of
money is rooted in “linear-separable” views of Anglo-American cultures, who
view time as a continuum stretching from past to present to future. In these
cultures, time is considered to be an essential component of money (e.g., via
discount rate/interest rate), a notion that we know from modern economic
and finance textbooks. Other cultures, however, may have dramatically dif-
ferent views of time. In particular, Graham (GrahamGraham1981) explains
that Latin American cultures perceive time as a circular concept that repeats
itself with a cyclical pattern. This “circular-traditional” view of time is the
root of the man˜ana attitudes in Mexico and other parts of Latin America,
where people’s activities are much more oriented towards the present than
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towards the future. Therefore, immediate rewards are preferred. This may
explain the low percentage of subjects who chose to wait in our Latin Eu-
ropean and Latin American samples (Figure 1), even though Latin Europe
is closer to Western Europe regarding economic conditions. Therefore we
should be cautious to simply equate the unwillingness to wait for the larger
payoff to a degree of impatience. As Graham (GrahamGraham1981) points
out, due to the large difference in the perception of time, in some cultures,
when a person is forced to choose between immediate and future rewards, he
may view this not as evaluating alternatives, because future rewards were per-
ceived as of no real value. “He was essentially asked if he wanted something
or nothing”, and thus, “what one person views as a choice situation, another
views as mandated action.” (Graham, GrahamGraham1981, p.341) In the
one-year and ten-year matching questions, when students were asked to state
the amount of money that makes them indifferent, Latin European exhibited
similar preferences as Germanic/Nordic cultures, whereas Latin Americans
were slightly “less” patient. This again suggests that the one-month waiting
question reflects more a general attitude, whereas the one-year and ten-year
matching questions may be more treated as evaluative questions.
Besides the cultural differences captured by the three aforementioned
Hofstede dimensions, there are of course countless differences that cannot be
captured that easily within a simple survey. We find strong evidence that
these differences also affect time discounting in a significant way: including
dummy variables with cultural clusters into the regression leads to significant
coefficients, especially for the waiting question: Germanic/Nordic subjects,
but also to a lesser extent Asian, Middle East and Anglo-American subjects
showed ceteris paribus more “patience”. These results suggest that beyond
the cultural dimensions by Hofstede, further cultural differences are a key to
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the understanding of the heterogeneity in time discounting.
There are other cultural differences that may affect time discounting.
Financial discounting, for instance, is found to be related to a range of psy-
chological variables, such as conscientiousness (Daly, Delaney, & Harmon,
Daly, Delaney, & HarmonDaly et al.2009). Terracciano et al. (Terracciano
et al.Terracciano et al.2005) reported that in their sample German Switzer-
land, Sweden, Germany, Burkina Faso, and Estonia have the highest scores
on Conscientiousness, whereas Spain, Turkey, Croatia, Chile, and Indone-
sia have the lowest scores on Conscientiousness. This again seems to be
consistent with our findings: those countries with higher Conscientiousness
scores are more likely to wait for the delayed larger reward in our one-month
question.
5.2 Methodological Concerns
There could be five major concerns or limitations regarding the survey method
we adopted here. The first is that we only used university students as sub-
jects, not a representative sample of the total population. There are, however,
several advantages of this sample selection: (1) First and second year eco-
nomic students understand better the numeric formulations of lottery and
time-preference questions than the general public, but can still answer the
questions intuitively. (2) Students from economics can also be expected to
play an important role in economics and financial markets in each country
and in the global market. The time and risk preferences we study here are rel-
evant for those finance-related activities. (3) Most importantly, as Hofstede
(HofstedeHofstede1991), a leading researcher in cross-cultural comparisons,
emphasized: to make a cross-national comparison, it is crucial to recruit
homogeneous, comparable groups from each country in order to control the
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background variables as much as possible. University students of economics
can be considered as a sample satisfying these properties well.
The second concern about our survey method might be that we only
elicited hypothetical questions without offering real monetary incentives,
such that participants may not be motivated to give thoughtful answers.
However, researchers who compared directly the real and hypothetical re-
wards did not find clear and systematic differences (Johnson & Bickel, John-
son & BickelJohnson & Bickel2002; Coller & Williams, Coller & WilliamsColler
& Williams1999; Kirby & Marakovic, Kirby & MarakovicKirby & Marakovic1995).
Moreover, hypothetical questions have even some advantages in the domain
of time preferences because they allow to ask questions involving a long
time span and large payoffs (Frederick et al., Frederick, Loewenstein, &
O’DonoghueFrederick et al.2002).
A third concern is whether the sample size in each country is sufficiently
large and representative. Previous research shows that even within the same
country, the cultural difference can be very large, e.g., Talhelm et al. (Talhelm
et al.Talhelm et al.2014). Indeed, we would have been happy to have large
sample sizes in every country, but in a few countries this was infeasible.
However, the total number of subjects is substantial and the large number
of countries from which we collected data allows to test competing factors
on the country level that a study in fewer countries with a larger subject
pool in each country could not achieve. Moreover, we have shown that the
between-country variation, as compared to the within-country variation, is
large enough to justify our approach.
A further concern is whether time preferences can be elicited indepen-
dently from the interest rates of the markets to which the respondents have
access to. One can argue that in a perfect capital market where individu-
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als can borrow and lend freely, the personal taste concerning time preference
cannot be elicited, because intertemporal choices are made such that the per-
sonal discount rate corresponds to the interest rate in the market. If markets
were perfect and people answered the question relating the stated monetary
amounts to the borrowing and lending opportunities in these markets then
we would find the discount rates measured in our survey to equal market
interest.
Many studies, however, have shown that stated discount rates tend to
be much larger (compare the survey of Frederick (FrederickFrederick2005)).
One of the reasons might be that in reality markets are far from perfect:
even in countries with well-developed financial systems there are many con-
straints, particularly on borrowing money. They can be institutional or cul-
tural in nature: in some countries, obtaining a loan might be impossible for
many people (compare Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Peria (Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-
Kunt, and PeriaBeck et al.2008) for an international comparison study on
this issue), whereas in other countries taking a loan for consumption might
be considered simply as foolish behavior that could reduce reputation sub-
stantially. Another reason might be that the respondents understood the
difference between their personal time preference and the market interest
rate and answered the question applying the former, i.e. without considering
the borrowing and lending opportunities offered in the capital market they
have access to.
A final limitation of our study is that it only focuses on time preferences
in gains, and it is not clear whether the results can be generalised to intertem-
poral choices involving losses. Normative economic theories prescribe people
to discount both future gains and losses due to opportunity cost and uncer-
tainty, and there should be no differences in discount rates in gains and losses.
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However, a general finding is that gains are discounted more than losses.
This has been called the sign effect (Benzion et al., Benzion, Rapoport, &
YagilBenzion et al.1989; Thaler, ThalerThaler1981; Yates & Watts, Yates
& WattsYates & Watts1975). More strikingly, a substantial proportion of
participants even prefer a sooner loss to a later loss of the same or smaller
size, showing none or even a negative discounting tendency, e.g., Hardisty
and Weber (Hardisty and WeberHardisty and Weber2009), Hardisty, Appelt,
and Weber (Hardisty, Appelt, and WeberHardisty et al.2013), Loewenstein
(LoewensteinLoewenstein1987), Sun et al. (Sun et al.Sun et al.2015), van der
Pol and Cairns (van der Pol and Cairnsvan der Pol and Cairns2000).
The underlying determinants of time discounting, including neural, psy-
chological, social and economic factors, can be very different in gains and
losses, and the interaction is complicated. Xu, Liang, Wang, Li, and Jiang
(Xu, Liang, Wang, Li, and JiangXu et al.2009) demonstrate that although
intertemporal choices in gains and losses both activate brain regions that are
related to high-level cognitive processes, discounting future losses leads to
greater activation of brain regions related to negative emotions. This is in
line with the finding by Hardisty and Weber (Hardisty and WeberHardisty
and Weber2009): higher CRT (cognitive reflection test) scores are related to
less discounting in gains but have no effects in losses.
Both studies seem to imply that discounting losses is a more affective
than cognitive process. Moreover, Hardisty and Weber (Hardisty and We-
berHardisty and Weber2009) suggest that social and cultural norms typically
encourage people to wait for larger later gains, but to avoid larger later losses
(patient in both gains and losses), whereas the fixed-cost present bias as
documented by Benhabib, Bisin, and Schotter (Benhabib, Bisin, and Schot-
terBenhabib et al.2010) (i.e., psychological desire to resolve events immedi-
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ately) may lead people to accept both immediate gains and losses (impatient
in gains but patient in losses). Therefore, we expect that cultural factors
such as Long-Term Orientation should increase patience in both gains and
losses (wait for later gains and avoid larger later losses), whereas factors that
are more related to psychological dread such as Uncertainty Avoidance may
cause people to want immediate gains and losses (i.e., decreases patience
in gains but increases patience in losses). Moreover, a recent neutral study
by Tanaka, Yamada, Yoneda, and Ohtake (Tanaka, Yamada, Yoneda, and
OhtakeTanaka et al.2014) report that participants with the sign effect ex-
hibit stronger brain activity to magnitude and delay of losses than that of
gain, suggesting loss aversion as potential mechanism to sign effect. Using
INTRA survey, Wang, Rieger, and Hens (Wang, Rieger, and HensWang et
al.2016) report the relation between culture and loss aversion, and discuss
the potential role of emotional regulation. Taken together, we may also de-
duce that countries with stronger loss aversion also tend to exhibit stronger
sign effect due to the variation of emotion regulation shaped via cultural
influence. We encourage future research to establish further hypotheses and
test empirically the relation of culture and time discounting in both gains
and losses to help us understand the social and psychological mechanisms for
time discounting.
6 Conclusion
We report an international survey on time preference across 53 countries. Our
results are consistent with the previous hyperbolic discounting literature in
that all countries exhibit stronger discounting for one year than for ten years.
More importantly, there is a large cross-country variation in responses to time
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preference questions, especially to questions concerning waiting tendency and
short-term discounting rate. Several Hofstede cultural dimensions are cor-
related to the time preference measure. We suggest several applications by
using time preference to explain cross-country difference innovation, environ-
mental protection, credit rating, and health-related behavior as reflected in
the BMI.
Several independent variables in our regression models were endogenous.
Ideally, the parameters should have been estimated by using a simultaneous
equation system. With our cross-section data, it is difficult to identify in-
strumental or lagged variables for such analysis. If time series data could
be collected in the future, then one might gain more insights about causal
relationships. Despite these limitations, this study sheds light on several
important aspects of time preference.
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Highlights:
• We conducted an international survey on time preferences in 52 countries.
• All countries exhibit hyperbolic discounting patterns.
• Uncertainty Avoidance and Long Term Orientation are related to time 
preferences.
• Time discounting correlates with innovation, environmental protection, 
innovation, etc.
